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Abstract
The separation between the public and private spheres on online social networks is known
to be at best blurred. On the one hand, previous studies have shown how it is possible to
infer private attributes from publicly available data. On the other hand, no distinction
exists between public and private data when we consider the ability of the OSN provider to
access them. Even when OSN users go to great lengths to protect their privacy, such as by
using encryption or communication obfuscation, correlations between data may render these
solutions useless. In this paper, we study the relationship between private communication
patterns and publicly available OSN data. Such relationship informs both privacy-invasive
inferences as well as OSN communication modelling, the latter being key towards developing
effective obfuscation tools. We propose an inference model based on Bayesian analysis and
evaluate, using a real social network dataset, how archetypal social graph features can lead
to inferences about private communication. Our results indicate that both friendship graph
and public traffic data may not be informative enough to enable these inferences, with time
analysis having a non-negligible impact on their precision.
1 Introduction
Privacy breaches in online social networks (OSNs) have become commonplace. Context col-
lision Danah Boyd (2008), unexpected or regrettable disclosures Wang et al. (2011), cyber-
stalking Gross and Acquisti (2005), blackmailing Gross and Acquisti (2005) or law enforcement
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prowling Marks (2006) are only a few of the privacy threats users may face in OSNs. Inferences
are a particular type of privacy threat that rely on correlations between data to learn private,
non available data from publicly available data Heatherly et al. (2013); Zheleva and Getoor
(2009). Information publicly available on social networks enables inferences about data that
users have not publicly shared, such as their sexual orientations Jernigan and Mistree (2009),
their political views, or the use of illegal substances Kosinski et al. (2013), among other types
of attributes.
In order to shield themselves from these privacy threats, OSN users may use a range of
privacy preserving tools and strategies, e.g., they may plainly refrain from uploading certain
information to the site or deliberately lie in order to blur certain details of their persona. They
may use privacy settings that enable them to control the visibility of their data, choosing between
posting information publicly, or communicating privately with a small subset of their friends.
Privacy settings effectively allow users to limit the amount of information publicly available;
yet the service provider is still able to access privately shared information. More stringent
cryptographic access control tools such as Scramble Beato et al. (2011), can effectively prevent
the service provider from accessing the OSN users’ private information. Still, encryption does
not conceal traffic data. Even when all data and communications are encrypted, the service
provider is still able to monitor the users’ communication patterns, namely, who the users
communicate with, how much, and how often, as well as other activities performed by the users
on the site.
Communication patterns potentially reveal who users are most intimate with, their affinity
in terms of age, religion and kinship, or their political views, among other attributes. They
may also expose the strength of the users’ relationships and how they evolve with time. In
particular, users may choose to favour private messaging over public communication (i.e., posts)
to hide discreditable or sensitive information. Examples include two people having a romantic
affair, community leaders secretly organising an event, hiding from the broader public who the
leaders and their social circle are in the community, or users reaching out to others for help with
sensitive issues (e.g., bullying, medical advise).
Yet hiding communication patterns in the same way that encryption hides messages is im-
possible, and alternative strategies must be devised, such as obfuscation. Obfuscation tools send
dummy traffic on behalf of the users to conceal their communication patterns: an eavesdropper,
such as the OSN provider, observes a mix of real and dummy traffic; and is as a result no longer
able to retrieve an accurate representation of the users’ real communication patterns.
For dummy traffic to work, it must be indistinguishable from real traffic. Even if encryption
prevents the service provider from distinguishing between real and dummy traffic based on
the content of the messages, other attributes such as the timing or size of the messages may
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be exploitable. In particular, OSNs pose a particularly challenging scenario as the wealth
of data available may give away information about how users communicate. Do two users
communicate more when they have more friends in common? Does their number of friends
affect their communication patterns? Can we tell how a user communicates by looking at other
publicly available information in the OSN?
Previous research has focused on modelling the OSN structure and studying inferences of
private attributes from publicly available data. However, little is known about the feasibility of
inferring communication patterns.
In this paper, we take the first steps towards this goal by performing, to the best of our
knowledge, a first study on the feasibility of inferring private communication patterns from
publicly available friendship and communication traffic data. To this end, we propose a model
for communication inference in OSNs and analyse a dataset from a Belgian social network,
Netlog1, to determine how both friendship graph and public traffic data can expose private
communication patterns.
This paper provides several contributions. Firstly, we study the likelihood with which an
adversary can infer the private communication patterns of a user even when it only has access
to OSN encrypted data or data stripped from its content. Examples of such scenario include
an OSN analyst that only obtains metadata from the service provider or an OSN provider that
implements end-to-end encryption and provides traffic data to a law enforcement agency.
Secondly, we provide an analysis of the topological and communication properties of Netlog,
partially replicating previous studies. This allows us to further confirm the existence of key OSN
properties such as the power-law degree distribution or the fact that users only communicate
with a small subset of their friends.
Lastly, our results inform design strategies of obfuscation tools to achieve indistinguishability
between real and dummy traffic, e.g., preventing dummy traffic to be filtered out when it does not
match expected correlations with other available OSN data. Besides, our study can also inform
OSN communication models, and thus allow researchers to simulate realistic communication
patterns in OSNs.
2 Related work
In this section we shortly review how our work extends, differs from and complements previous
work on the field.
1Netlog was merged with Twoo in 2015. Accessing en.netlog.com in April 2017 automatically redirects to
www.twoo.com.
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2.1 Modelling of online social networks
The problem of inferring communication patterns is analogous to deriving a model of communi-
cation in OSNs. Most efforts on OSN modelling have however been devoted to derive a model
of the topology of the social graph, namely, a model of the characteristics of the network struc-
ture Ahn et al. (2007); Kossinets and Watts (2006); Kumar et al. (2010); Mislove et al. (2008,
2007), while fewer works have attempted to model activity and communication behaviour.
Network Topology
Several distinguishing properties of social graph topology have been identified in the literature.
Power-law degree distributions Baraba´si and Albert (1999), small diameters Watts and Strogatz
(1998), assortativity Mislove et al. (2007), community structure and network modularity Ferrara
and Fiumara (2012) are among the most representative. These properties have in turn informed
social network graphs generators that attempt to generate synthetic yet realistic social network
graphs Sala et al. (2010). Still, these models are limited in that they only describe the topology
of the network and do not capture users’ activity, this is, how users communicate and the actions
they perform in the OSN.
Users’ Activity
Benevenuto et al. have proposed a model of OSN user behaviour that, to the best of our knowl-
edge, is the most ambitious and comprehensive so far Benevenuto et al. (2009, 2012). They
provide, among other features, a characterisation of session timing, the frequency and type
of activities performed in the OSN and the number of friends users interact with. Similarly,
Gyarmati and Trinh Gyarmati and Trinh (2010) have proposed a model of the number of logins
and session duration per user based on their analysis of four popular social networks. These
models however do not study how these activity features relate to one another or to other OSN
data (e.g., topology). We provide a first contribution in this direction.
Despite the fact that no general model for user interaction has been proposed so far, social
network activity has received significant attention in the literature, unveiling recurrent, char-
acteristic patterns. Users have been found to typically communicate with a small subset of
their friends Chun et al. (2008); Golder et al. (2006); Wilson et al. (2009) and to reply to most
messages and posts received on the OSN, i.e., OSN interactions feature high reciprocity Chun
et al. (2008); Jiang et al. (2010); Wilson et al. (2009). User communication also exhibits marked
temporal patterns, e.g., differences between workdays and weekends Golder et al. (2006), or the
fact that communication between two users seldom persists over time Viswanath et al. (2009). In
this paper we analyse a different OSN dataset to confirm many of these findings. Moreover, we
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also take up these previously identified OSN properties to carry out our work on the feasibility
of inferences.
2.2 Inferences on OSNs
In this paper we study the feasibility of inferring private communication patterns on an OSN.
Previous works have focused instead on inferring sensitive attributes such as sexual orientation
or political affiliation. Their methodology is however very similar to ours, namely, based on
Bayesian analysis. We shortly review some of these prior contributions.
He et al. He et al. (2006) have proposed an analysis framework based on Bayesian networks
to infer personal attributes of OSN users based on the attribute values their friends declare.
To test the suitability of the framework, they synthetically generate attributes for a network
of users in LiveJournal2, demonstrating that their framework successfully exposes relationships
between the attributes of a user and her friends. Heatherly et al. Heatherly et al. (2013) show
that combining both non sensitive attribute values and friendship links leads to more accurate
inferences of sensitive values. Moreover, they propose countermeasures based on the removal of
links and attributes to thwart potential inferences based on them.
Mislove et al. on the other hand use community detection to infer the attributes of the
users in the network Mislove et al. (2010). Relying on the assumption that unknown users’
attributes can be inferred from the attributes of the people in their community, Mislove et al.
show that as few as 20% users with known attributes may allow very accurate inferences over
the attributes of the remaining users. Zheleva and Getoor combine both community detection
techniques and Bayesian analysis to infer, among other attributes, gender, location and marital
status; suggesting that whereas friendship links do not necessarily enable accurate inferences,
community membership does Zheleva and Getoor (2009). Chaabane et al. exploit semantic
relationships between user data to infer unknown attributes Chaabane et al. (2012). They rely
on a measure of similarity to assign to the unknown attributes of a user the known value of
other, similar users.
Inferences may also allow to learn not only private information about the present state of the
OSN and its users, but also about future events, e.g., the evolution of the OSN. Link prediction
attempts to infer future interactions between OSN users taking into account the current state
of the OSN. Some of the existing approaches Liben-Nowell and Kleinberg (2003); Al Hasan and
J. Zaki (2011) are based on assigning a score to pairs of nodes to represent their proximity or
similarity, an idea we also leverage in this paper.
2http://www.livejournal.com/
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2.3 Obfuscation tools for traffic analysis resistance
Our work is further inspired by the design of obfuscation tools for traffic analysis resistance in
online social networks Balsa et al. (2012). The goal of these tools is to prevent an adversary (be it
the service provider or an external adversary) from profiling the users’ communication patterns,
namely, to accurately determine with whom and how often OSN users communicate. In order
to do that, these tools generate and send out dummy traffic, i.e., fake, cover traffic that prevents
an observer from accurately determining with whom the user actually communicates. To do this
effectively, dummy messages must be indistinguishable from real ones. A first step to achieve
this is to encrypt all communications, so that the adversary cannot distinguish real and dummy
messages based on their content. Content is however not the only piece of information that may
leak information about which messages are real and which ones are not. Correlations between
the number of messages a user sends to a friend and other types of features may undermine the
plausibility of the dummy traffic being generated. For example, if the number of private messages
two users exchange and the number of posts that they leave on each other’s wall are correlated,
an obfuscation tool needs to take this into account to generate dummy traffic. Otherwise, if
Alice does not communicate with Charlie and Alice’s obfuscation tool sends dummy messages
to Charlie, the adversary can potentially dismiss those dummy messages as obfuscation because
she knows that if Alice had actually sent messages to Charlie she would have also posted on
his wall. Our work therefore aims to inform the design of obfuscation tools for traffic analysis
resistance by providing a first analysis of the relationship between OSN communication and
other OSN features.
3 Communication Inference in Online Social Networks
3.1 A model of communication in online social networks
We model an online social network (OSN) as a mixed multigraph G := (V, F, P,M). The set
of nodes V represents the OSN users. The set of friendships F represents friend relations
between the OSN users. The multiset of posts P , represents messages publicly posted on users’
walls. The multiset of messages M represents the private messages sent on the OSN. Friendship
relationships are represented with undirected edges while posts and messages are represented
with arcs (directed edges).
For a specific OSN user a ∈ V , say Alice, F (a) denotes Alice’s set of friend relationships.
The set of posts sent and received by Alice are denoted as P−→(a) and P←−(a), respectively. The
sets of sent and received messages are analogously represented as M−→(a) and M←−(a). The absence
of an arrow indicates that both directions are considered thus M(a) = {M−→(a) ∪ M←−(a)} and
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Table 1: Notation summary
Symbol Definition
G := (V, F, P,M) Mixed multigraph representing the OSN
V Set of OSN users (nodes)
F Set of friendships (edges)
P Multiset of public posts (arcs)
M Multiset of private messages (arcs)
F (a) Alice’s set of friend relationships
P−→(a) Multiset of posts sent by Alice
M←−(a) Multiset of messages received by Alice
P (a) {P−→(a) ∪ P←−(a)}
M(a) {M−→(a) ∪M←−(a)}
P−→(a,b) Multiset of posts Alice sent to Bob
M(a, b) Multiset of messages exchanged between Alice to Bob,
i.e., M(a,b) = {M−→(a, b) ∪M←−(a, b)}
VF (a) Set of nodes that are friends with Alice
VP−→(a) Set of nodes to whom Alice sent posts
VM (a) Set of nodes that sent to or received messages from Alice,
i.e., VM (a) = {VM−→(a) ∪ VM←−(a)}
S¯ Cardinality of the set S
Superscript T Specifies time frame
P (a) = {P−→(a) ∪ P←−(a)}.
The set P−→(a, b) represents the posts Alice sent to Bob and, in the same way, M−→(a,b)
represents the messages Alice sent to Bob.
We denote as VF (a) the set of nodes in the induced subgraph formed by the set of friendships
of Alice, this is, the set of nodes representing the friends of Alice. In the same way, VP (a)
(respectively, VM (a)) is the set of nodes in the induced subgraph formed by the multiset of
posts P (analogously, messages M) sent and received by Alice, this is, the set of users that sent
and received posts (correspondingly, messages) to and from Alice.
We denote as S¯ the cardinality of a set S, e.g., V¯F (a) denotes the number of friends Alice
has on the OSN.
We use a superscript T to refer to communication taking place on a specific time period T ,
e.g., VM−→
T (a) represents the set of users Alice sent a message to during time period T .
Table 1 presents a summary of all the notation described above.
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3.2 Evaluating the feasibility of communication inference in online social
networks
We model as random variables, R, both unknown variables to be inferred and evidence variables
to perform inferences from. We denote the probability distribution of a random variable as
P[R = x ], e.g., P[ M¯−→(a,b) = x ] represents the probability of a number x of messages sent by
Alice to Bob. Similarly, P[R1 | R2, R3, . . . , Rk ] denotes the conditional probability of R1 given
evidence from random variables {R2, R3, . . . , Rk}, e.g., P[ M¯−→(a, b) = z | P¯←−(b, a) = x ] represents
the probability that Alice sends z messages to Bob given that Bob left x posts on Alice’s wall.
We use Shannon entropy Shannon (1948), denoted as H(R), to measure the amount of
uncertainty about the expected value of a random variable R. In other words, we use entropy
to measure how easy it would be to infer the value of R. Low values of entropy represent
easy inferences, namely, some values R = r are far more likely than others. Conversely, high
values of entropy indicate harder inference problems, as there is significant uncertainty about
the actual value that R may take. The conditional entropy, denoted as H(R1 | R2, R3, . . . , Rk ),
measures the uncertainty about the expected value of R1 when information about random
variables {R2, R3, . . . , Rk} is available. Conditional entropy ranges from 0 to H(R1). When
values R2 = r2, R3 = r3, . . . , Rk = rk univocally determine R1 = r1, conditional entropy
is 0. Conversely, when values of R2, R3, . . . , Rk provide no additional information about R1,
conditional entropy equals H(R1), as values R2, R3, . . . , Rk reveal nothing about R1.
Both entropy and conditional entropy are related to mutual information through the follow-
ing expression: I(R1;R2) = H(R1) − H(R1|R2). We have favoured mutual information over
other measures of statistical dependence, such as correlation coefficients, for its equitability, i.e.,
its ability to detect general, not only linear or monotonic, dependence Khan et al. (2007); Kin-
ney and Atwal (2014). We have chosen however to present results in this paper in terms of
conditional entropy, which is trivial to obtain from the corresponding mutual information.
Practicalities The computation of both entropy and conditional entropy depends on the
estimation of the probability distribution of the random variables involved. We quantise random
variables to reduce the set of values they may take Balsa et al. (2012). Quantisation collapses
several values on one category of values, effectively increasing the number of samples available per
category. This reduces the error on the probability distribution estimation, albeit at the expense
of coarser random variable values. Moreover, shorter lists of values allow for a speedier thus
more efficient computation of the mutual information. To measure the underlying estimation
error we resort to Bayesian Inference, using the methods described in Balsa et al. (2012).
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Table 2: Description of the Netlog interaction dataset
Type Data Time period
Friendship User 1 ID User 2 ID Day & time Dec’02 - Oct’11
Posts Poster ID Recipient ID Day & time Dec’02 - Oct’11
Messages Sender ID Recipient ID Day & time May’11 - Oct’11
4 A Case Study: Netlog
4.1 The Netlog dataset
We have performed our study using a dataset from Netlog, a Belgian OSN.3 Our dataset com-
prises communication data from the Dutch-speaking subnetwork in Netlog. Specifically, it in-
cludes three different sets of interaction data4:
Friendship requests and acceptances In Sect. 3.1 we have modeled friendship as an undi-
rected edge between two users. We consider two users Alice and Bob to be friends (and
thus a friendship edge is added to the social graph between the node representing Alice
and the node representing Bob) when the dataset contains both a friendship request from
Alice to Bob and a friendship acceptance from Bob to Alice.
Private messages Messages that are only visible to the sender and recipient of the message.
The dataset contains traffic data of both sent and received private messages.
Public posts Messages that users leave on other users’ personal pages and are publicly avail-
able. The dataset contains traffic data of both sent and received private messages.
Table 2 outlines the data obtained for each type of interaction and the time period for which
complete data is available. Note that the dataset contains no personal attributes or the contents
of any message or post, but only metadata. Moreover, the dataset was de-identified, namely,
names were replaced by a random identifier.
Figure 1 sums up some statistics about the dataset. We use the acronym ‘AT’ (All Time)
to tag those figures that refer to all the time for which data are available. Otherwise, figures
refer to the six-month period of messages data. We use the terms posting and messaging users
to refer to users that posted and sent at least one post or message, respectively. Active users
either posted or sent at least one message and strictly active sent at least one of each. Note
that active users are a small fraction of the total number of users in the network, as previously
reported in the literature Benevenuto et al. (2009).
3See Footnote 1 in page 3.
4The dataset includes additional datafields which are not used for the study performed in this paper.
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Number of users 3 834 304
Number of posts (AT) 175 731 008
Number of messages 70 170 964
Posting users (AT) 1 763 931
Posting users 180 182
Messaging users 379 611
Active users 443 398
Strictly active users 270 327
Average friend. degree 24.96
Std. dev. friend. degree 161.1
Figure 1: Dataset statistics
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Figure 2: Degree probability distribution
Next we provide an analysis of the main features of both social graph and communication
activity in the network, discussing to what extent they match or deviate from the previous
studies we have referred to in Sect. 2. These features are the ones we use below in Sect. 4.2 to
perform our evaluation on the feasibility of inferring private communication patterns.
4.1.1 Social graph topology
Figure 2 displays the distribution of the number of friends each user has, P[ V¯f (a) ], which
approximately follows a power-law with α = 2.2.
Figure 3 represents the probability distribution of different features of Netlog’s social graph
topology. Figure 3a shows the probability distribution of the number of friends Alice has in
common with each of her friends, namely —slightly abusing notation5—, P[ V¯F (a∩ b) | V¯F (a) ].
Figure 3b shows the probability of the number of different people that two friends, Alice
and Bob, can jointly count among their friends, i.e., P[ V¯F (a ∪ b) | V¯F (a) ]. That number is
strongly correlated with the degree of Alice because users tend to become friends with people
that have a similar amount of friends in the OSN. This has been referred in the literature as
homophily Mislove et al. (2010) and is shown in Fig. 3c, which shows the probability of the
average degree of Alice’s friends given Alice’s own degree, namely, P[
∑
b∈F (a) V¯F (b)
V¯F (a)
| V¯F (a) ].
Lastly, Fig. 3d shows the probability distribution of the Jaccard coefficient between any two
friends, i.e., P[ JF (a, b) | V¯F (a) ], where JF (a, b) = V¯F (a∩b)V¯F (a∪b) . Note that the greater the degree of
Alice the lower the Jaccard coefficient is likely to be. The probability that Alice and Bob have
the same friends decreases as the degree of any of them increases.
5According to our notation rules the correct form should be P[VF (a) ∩ VF (b) | V¯F (a) ]
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Figure 3: Graph Features
4.1.2 Users’ Communication Activity
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the number of friends each user Alice communicates with,
depending on her number of friends V¯F (a), showing that the more friends a user has, the greater
the number of people V¯M−→(a) and V¯P−→(a) she sends messages or posts to, respectively. Not
surprisingly, the number of people a user communicates with increases over time, as shown in
Fig. 4c. Yet all three figures show that OSN users only communicate with a small subset of
their friends, confirming previous results Golder et al. (2006); Huberman et al. (2008); Viswanath
et al. (2009).
Figure 5 shows the probability distribution of the number of messages and posts a user Alice
sends to each of her friends. Figure 5a shows that the number of messages does not depend on
the number of friends Alice has, whereas Fig. 5b shows there is a slight dependency between
the number of posts Alice sends to Bob and her number of friends, i.e., the fewer friends Alice
has, the less posts she will send to each of them. Interestingly, this trend tends to disappear
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Figure 4: Distributions of the number of people a user sends messages and posts to.
over time, as shown in Fig. 5c.
Figure 6 describes the probability distribution of the total number of messages (Fig. 6a) and
posts (Figs. 6b and 6c) sent by Alice, supporting Fig. 4 in that the total number of messages
and posts a user sends depends on the number of friends she has.
Lastly, Fig. 7 represents the degree of reciprocity for both messages (7a) and posts (7b
and 7c). The figures represent the histogram of the pairs of counts of messages (or posts,
according to the figure) that Alice sent to Bob and Bob sent to Alice. Darker areas represent
a higher incidence of those pairs of values in the network. For example, the number of times
that Alice sends 3 messages to Bob and Bob sends 3 messages to Alice is much higher (in the
dark area of the figures) than the number of times that Alice sends 3 messages to Bob and Bob
sends 100 messages to Alice (in the light area of the figures). As shown in all three figures and
confirming what has been previously reported Chun et al. (2008); Jiang et al. (2010); Wilson
et al. (2009), users have a strong tendency to reciprocate the messages and posts they receive.
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Figure 5: Distributions of the number of messages and posts Alice sends to Bob.
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Figure 6: Probability distributions of the total number of messages and posts Alice sends.
4.2 Inferring private communication in Netlog
In this section we present the results of our evaluation on the feasibility of inferring private
communication patterns. Unless otherwise stated, all figures included in this section follow the
same representation formula. They display conditional probability distributions P[Z | X ] where
Z represents the variable to be inferred (e.g., number of messages sent by Alice to Bob) and X
represents the evidence variable (e.g., the number of friends Alice and Bob have in common).
In the figures, the x-axis represents values of the independent variable X = x, and the y-axis
the probability P[Z = z | X = x ]. The figures may also feature error bars, which represent
the standard error on a 99% confidence interval. Table 3 summarises the features that we have
chosen to analyse in our study.
4.2.1 Messaging behaviour based on network topology features
We have analysed the relationship between the network topology and the number of private
messages users send.
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Figure 7: Communication Reciprocity
Table 3: List of features involved in our inference analysis. The posts graph is the communication
graph induced by the multiset of posts P
Data source Features Source visibility
Friendship V¯F (a) ; V¯F (a ∩ b) ; V¯F (a ∪ b) ; JF (a,b) Public
Posts P¯−→(a,b) ; P¯−→(b, a)
P¯−→
T (a,b) ; P¯−→
T (b, a)
Posts graph V¯P (a ∩ b) ; V¯P−→(a ∩ b) ; V¯P←−(a ∩ b)
V¯PT (a ∩ b) ; V¯P−→T (a ∩ b) ; V¯P←−T (a ∩ b)
V¯PT (a ∪ b) ; V¯P−→T (a ∪ b) ; V¯P←−T (a ∪ b)
Private messages M¯(a,b) ; M¯−→(a, b) ; M¯−→(b, a) Private
Messages sent given topological degree (number of friends) Figures 4 and 6 have
shown that with an increasing number of friends Alice is slightly more likely to send messages
to more of her friends as well as to send slightly more messages overall. However, those increases
are not linear with the number of friends, which means that Alice only communicates with a
small subset of her friends and distributes a limited “budget” of messages among them. We
analyse whether the number of Alice’s friends has an impact on this distribution, namely, Alice
may distribute her “budget” equally among her friends —sending less messages to each friend—,
or not —ignoring certain friends, whether old or new. Besides, if Alice has more friends, more
of those friends may send her messages and, considering strong reciprocity (cf. Fig. 7), that may
have an impact on how Alice chooses to communicate.
Figure 8a shows the conditional probability distribution of the number of messages Alice
sends to Bob given her number of friends, namely, P[ M¯−→(a, b) | V¯F (a) ]. Our results suggest that
the number of friends users have is not a good indicator of the number of messages they send to
any of their friends. Alice seems to choose the number of messages she sends to any of her friends
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(a) Probability distribution of the number of messages
Alice sends to Bob given Alice’s number of friends.
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(b) Probability distribution of the number of messages
Alice sends to Bob given Bob’s number of friends.
Figure 8: Inferring messages given topological degree
Table 4: Entropy of number of messages given topological degree
Bits
Ref.: H(M¯−→(a,b)) 0.2044
H(M¯−→(a, b) | V¯F (a)) 0.2033
H(M¯−→(a, b) | V¯F (b)) 0.2037
regardless of her own number of friends. This is in line with previous results Golder et al. (2006);
Huberman et al. (2008); Viswanath et al. (2009) showing that not only Alice communicates with
just a small subset of friends regardless of the total number of friends amassed on the social
network, but also that the amount of messages she sends to any of her friends is neither affected.
We posit that most of those additional friends are mere acquaintances that Alice is not interested
in communicating with on a regular basis, i.e., additional friends do not disrupt Alice’s stable
communication patterns with a small circle of friends.
Besides, Alice may choose to message more popular friends (i.e., Bob has many friends and
contacts on the network) or on the contrary favour less well-connected people (e.g., Bob has
fewer friends and can therefore devote more of his attention to her). From our analysis, the
number of messages Alice sends to Bob is independent from the number of friends Bob has,
as shown in Fig 8b. The analysis of the entropies, as shown in Table 4, further confirms this.
Knowing the number of friends either Alice or Bob have barely reduces the uncertainty on the
number of messages Alice sends to Bob. This suggests that Alice’s motivation to message Bob
is neither determined by Bob’s popularity nor lack thereof.
Messages exchanged given subnetwork graph We have analysed the relationship between
the number of messages two friends exchange with respect to various features of their local
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Figure 9: Messages exchanged given subnetwork graph.
subnetwork graph. This allows us to evaluate whether the network of friends surrounding two
users may reveal any information about the volume of their private communication. We posit
that if two users have several friends in common, they may belong to a tight social circle (e.g.,
their family) and may therefore be likely to be in touch and often communicate. On the other
hand, a very large number of common friends may also mean that both users belong to a large
and loose community of acquaintances (like a company’s employees or university alumni) and
may therefore seldom communicate.
The total number of friends two users have may also reveal information about how much
they communicate. Users that together total a small number of friends may message each other
more often, as they have few other friends to communicate with. Conversely, when either Alice
or Bob (or both) have a large number of friends, the probability that they message each other
might be smaller, as they have many other friends they can communicate with. Lastly, it may
be that users only communicate more with each other when the amount of common friends
they share make up a certain percentage of their friends. If Alice and Bob share many common
friends but those are all the friends they have, they may simply be using the social network to
keep in touch with a loose community of acquiantances. Conversely, if their common friends
represent just a fraction of their friends, they may be part of a tighter circle of friends and
communicate more often.
Figure 9 shows the probability of the number of messages two users exchange given their mu-
tual friends (Fig. 9a), the union of their friends, (Fig. 9b), and their Jaccard coefficient (Fig. 9c).
None of the three features seems to provide information about the number of private messages
two users exchange. The probability of any number of messages stays relatively constant for
numbers of mutual friends below 1024. Beyond that number the error increases significantly
—as few users have more than 1024 mutual friends—, yet nothing indicates a potential change
in trend.
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Table 5: Entropy of messages exchanged given subnetwork graph
Bits
Ref.: H(M¯(a,b)) 0.2751
H(M¯(a, b) | V¯F (a ∩ b)) 0.2745
H(M¯(a, b) | V¯F (a ∪ b)) 0.2734
H(M¯(a, b) | JF (a, b)) 0.2738
Table 5 displays the results of the entropies analysis. This confirms that all three features
provide little information, with the union of friends being only slightly more informative. Note
that the Jaccard index depends on both the number of mutual friends (non-informative) and
the union of friends (slightly more informative), thus the effect of the former may diminish the
amount of information provided by the latter.
We posit that because two users can often belong to several loose communities where they
share many common friends (e.g., colleagues, schoolmates, university alumni and neighbours, to
name a few) this is not a good indicator of the volume of communication between two people.
Similarly, the union of the set of friends and the Jaccard coefficient between two users do
not provide significant information about the number of messages they exchange. The former
supports previous results in that it seems that communication between users does not depend
on how many friends they have, i.e., users communication patterns with their close group of
friends is unaffected by the number of friends each of them has on the network. The latter is
on the other hand a combination of both the intersection and the union sets of friends. The
combination of both features does not seem to provide significant information about the amount
of private communication. Again, this may be due to the fact that users belong to different loose
communities that may or may not make up the great majority of their friends. High variability in
size, number and overlap of these communities may explain why the Jaccard coefficient provides
no additional information.
4.2.2 Messaging behaviour based on posting behaviour
We have analysed the relationship between private communication patterns and public commu-
nication patterns.
Messages sent given sent or received posts Users may choose to send private messages
to people they are not willing to publicly reveal they communicate with. On the other hand,
users may also largely use both messages and posts interchangeably to communicate with their
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friends. We have analysed whether any relationship exists between the number of posts and
messages two users exchange. Figure 10a represents the probability of the number of messages
Alice sends to Bob given the number of posts she writes to him in the same period of time (i.e.,
6 months). The probability of having sent at least one or more messages significantly rises when
Alice leaves a post on Bob’s wall, steadily increasing for even larger numbers of posts. The
same is true when we consider the number of posts Alice receives from Bob, shown in Fig. 10b,
suggesting that the number of posts Alice sends to Bob and the ones she receives from him are
equally informative to infer the number of messages they have exchanged. This is not surprising
given the high communication reciprocity observed in the network (cfr. Fig. 7). Knowing that
Alice sent a specific number of posts to Bob does not however precisely determine the number
of messages she has sent to him, as the probability to send any number of messages increases
with the number of posts at a rather similar and marginally incremental rate for any number of
messages.
Hence, these results suggest that private messaging is more likely to take place when public
posting has taken place. However, there is no correlation between the volume of public and
private communication, i.e., it is not possible to assume that if Alice leaves a large volume of
posts on Bob’s wall she will also send her a large number of messages. Therefore, users do
not interchangeably choose to send messages or posts to their friends, as if that was the case
there should be a correlation between both types of communication. Still, these results have
implications for communication modelling and obfuscation, namely, a realistic and plausible
model of user communication must consider overlapping subsets of friends for both private and
public communication.
We have tested whether having access to a longer history of posting behaviour enables better
inferences, the rationale being that long term observation of public behaviour enables to more
acurately determine who are a users’ “true” friends. Figure 10c represents the probability that
Alice sends z messages to Bob on a 6-month period given that Alice wrote to him x posts in
the previous 9 years. The probability that Alice sends messages to Bob still increases with the
number of posts she or he left on his or her wall. However, the relationship between posts and
messages seems to be weaker, suggesting that communication profiles are not stable and therefore
previous posting history may not be as reliable a predictor of recent messaging behaviour as
the evidence of recent posts. Another hypothesis suggests that users choose to message close,
long-term friends through alternative communication channels to social media, favouring the
latter for casual, sporadic conversation with a clique of friends.
Table 6 shows the entropies of the distributions represented above. Note that the entropy of
the messages probability distribution barely changes conditioned on the number of posts. This
highlights that, in spite of the trends shown in the pictures, information about the number of
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Table 6: Entropy of sent messages given sent/received posts
Bits
Ref.: H(M¯−→(a,b)) 0.2044
H(M¯−→(a,b) | P¯−→(a,b)) 0.1989
H(M¯−→(a,b) | P¯−→(b, a)) 0.1996
H(M¯−→(a,b) | P¯−→
T (a, b)) (AT) 0.2031
H(M¯−→(a,b) | P¯−→
T (b, a)) (AT) 0.2033
publicly exchanged posts does not provide significant information about the private messages.
Still, this may predominantly be due to the fact that, in this OSN, users exchange no messages
regardless of the number of posts they have left for each other.
Lastly, we have analysed whether considering proportions or percentages instead of absolute
numbers may lead to better inferences. Figure 10e represents the probability that Alice sends
to Bob a certain percentage of all the messages she sends when she has written to Bob a certain
percentage of all the posts she wrote (when Alice has written at least 5 posts) and Fig. 10f when
she has received from Bob a certain percentage of all the posts people have posted to her (when
Alice has received at least 5 posts). Both figures show that considering proportions of posts
instead of absolute numbers do not enable better inferences either. This result further debunks
the idea that users interchangeably use posts and messages to communicate with their friends,
as otherwise both percentages would be correlated.
Exchanged messages given posting friends We have analysed the relationship between
the number of messages two friends exchange with respect to their shares of posting friends,
namely, those friends they send to or receive posts from. Specifically, we have considered the
number of mutual posting friends (Figs. 11a and 11b) and the union of posting friends (Fig. 11c).
Note that this is a “hybrid” analysis that combines evidence of public communication with the
graph structure or network it induces. The first hypothesis is that if Alice and Bob leave posts
to the same set of people, they may be more likely to also communicate with each other. The
same reasoning we have proposed in section 4.2.1 applies to the analysis below of more complex
features such as intersection, union and Jaccard coefficient over sets of posting friends.
Our analysis of the data shows however that none of these features enable inferences of
private message communication. The number of friends that both Alice and Bob have sent
to or received messages from provides little information about the number of messages Alice
and Bob exchange, regardless of whether we consider the posts on the same period of time
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Figure 10: Probability distribution of messages sent given sent/received posts.
(Fig. 11a) or a longer history (Fig. 11b). The probability that Alice and Bob exchange at least
one message substantially increases when the number of mutual posting friends is greater than
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Figure 11: Probability distributions of exchanged messages given posting friends.
one. As for the exact number of messages exchanged, this evidence variable does not provide
enough information. The same occurs when considering the union of posting friends, namely,
those friends that at least Alice or Bob have sent to or received a post from. The analysis of the
conditional entropy confirms these results, as shown in Table 7 where we include the results of
further analyses which we have not represented in the figure mainly due to the high similarity
with the ones above.
There may be a number of reasons that explain this. The simpler is that users in this par-
ticular network favour public posting over private messaging, therefore exhibiting a generalised
lack of private communication that barely correlates with any other examined feature. A more
complex explanation is that the wide variety of types of users, the communities they belong
to and the contexts and situations in which they choose to communicate contribute to multi-
ple forms of communication that fail to emerge as consistent patterns to enable inferences. In
the next section we further discuss the results presented up to this point and their practical
implications.
5 Discussion
We mentioned in the introduction that our study has two main implications.
Firstly, regarding the feasibility of inferences, we set out to determine to what extent an
adversary could infer the private communication patterns of OSN users from OSN metadata.
Our analysis shows that it may not be possible to infer private communication patterns in OSNs
from publicly available data such as graph topology or public communication. In the particular
case of Netlog, an adversary would not be able to easily infer private communication patterns
from publicly available traffic patterns or the social graph topology. Were our results to be
confirmed for other social network data or features thereof, this would represent a “natural”
privacy protection against inferences. However, it is important to understand that it is not
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Table 7: Conditional entropies given posting friends sets
Bits
Ref.: H(M¯(a,b)) 0.2751
H(M¯(a,b) | V¯PT (a ∩ b)) (AT) 0.2744
H(M¯(a,b) | V¯P−→T (a ∩ b)) (AT) 0.2744
H(M¯(a, b) | V¯P←−T (a ∩ b)) (AT) 0.2730
H(M¯(a, b) | V¯P (a ∩ b)) 0.2712
H(M¯(a, b) | V¯P−→(a ∩ b)) 0.2726
H(M¯(a, b) | V¯P←−(a ∩ b)) 0.2721
H(M¯(a, b) | V¯PT (a ∪ b)) (AT) 0.2736
H(M¯(a, b) | V¯P−→T (a ∪ b)) (AT) 0.2737
H(M¯(a, b) | V¯P←−T (a ∪ b)) (AT) 0.2731
possible to generalise the results of our study to all OSNs.
Whereas many of our results are consistent with previous findings (e.g., the fact that users
communicate with a small subset of their friends or the fact that their communication exhibits
a high degree of reciprocity Chun et al. (2008); Golder et al. (2006); Wilson et al. (2009)),
that should not lead us to assume that the absence of correlations between the OSN data and
features we have considered is a universal property of all OSNs. These results relate to one
particular social network (Netlog) and a subset of all posible features that we have chosen to
examine. Future studies may uncover relationships between OSN features that enable inferences
on private communication, be it in other social networks (e.g., Facebook, Twitter, Google+ or
Renren, to name a few), from other available data such as Likes, comments or tagged photos or
from more complex graph or communication features (e.g., eccentricity, clustering coefficients or
centrality). In this sense, and similarly to the initial models of OSN topological structure that
only captured one or two (sometimes even conflicting) features Newman et al. (2002); Backstrom
et al. (2006); Kumar et al. (2010), our study is a first step and contribution in this direction.
Having said that, our analysis of the entropy of the conditional probability distributions
between the features we have examined leaves little room for doubt: in this particular social
network publicly available information about the graph and communication does not improve
our ability to infer the number of private messages users exchange. Considering the low volume
of communication our best guess would be to assume that, with high probability, two users do
not communicate at all. As indicated above, OSN users tend to befriend a large number of
people but only communicate with a small subset of them.
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We may further advance some hypotheses to explain the absence of correlations. OSNs
are known to feature tight-knit social structures Mislove et al. (2010), namely, users belong to
different closed communities where members are akin to each other. Considering that many of
these members share the same OSN features but users still communicate with only a small subset
of them, the features would not help us infer who among those members users communicate
with. In this sense, identifying the specific communities (e.g., close friends, relatives, co-workers)
and the links across them may allow for better inferences than the features of the underlying
graph structure.
More generally, communication traffic data and topological features stripped off all content
or semantics may simply not be informative enough to perform inferences on who the users
privately communicate with. One may need to know whether the friends two users have in
common are co-workers or relatives, or whether the posts that two users exchange are meant to
be read by a wide audience or a reduced subset of their friends. Besides, the effemeral nature
of the users’ communication behaviour, i.e., the fact that users’ communication profiles rapidly
change, may further prevent patterns and correlations between features from emerging.
Secondly, our results have also implications for the modelling of OSN communication and
the design of obfuscation tools for traffic analysis resistance in OSNs.
With respect to OSN modeling, not only have we confirmed, as shown in previous studies,
certain social graph topological properties such as the power-law nature of the friendship de-
gree distribution or the fact that users communicate with a small subset of their friends. Most
importantly, we have provided what to the best of our knowledge is the first analysis of the
relationship between private communication patterns and other OSN data such as public com-
munication traffic data and the social graph topology features, showing that, at least in the case
of Netlog, no direct relationship exists between these. The lack of correlations greatly simplifies
the modelling of OSN communication in OSNs, as each of the features can be generated and
simulated independently from each other.
We recall that our inference analysis was motivated by a particular threat model, namely, a
social network where users encrypt their communications and no content is available to either
the OSN service provider or an external adversary, “only” communication traffic and social
graph data. In this context, we wondered, would it be possible for these adversaries to infer
anything about the users’ private communications? And were this the case, what would it take
for users or privacy technology designers to prevent that from happening?
We must recall that Netlog itself provided to its users neither encryption tools nor com-
munication traffic or social graph data obfuscation tools. Yet none of these are limitations for
our study. On the one hand, by omitting the users’ communication content in our analyses we
have effectively “simulated” encrypted (and padded) communications. On the other hand, if
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Netlog provided communication traffic or social graph data obfuscation, it would have prevented
us from reliably determining whether correlations between these data existed (as we would be
measuring correlations between obfuscated data).
Analogously to the case of OSN communication modelling, the absence of correlations allows
a designer to treat these features independently Balsa et al. (2012). Effective obfuscation requires
plausibility. If OSN features are correlated, an obfuscation strategy must take this into account
as otherwise the adversary can exploit the correlation to filter the obfuscation out. The absence
of correlations thus not only prevents inferences but also simplifies the design of obfuscation
tools against more powerful adversaries.
Limitations Because our dataset was stripped off all content, we could not easily prune bots
and spammers off the dataset, thus their impact in our results cannot be accurately determined.
Still, our results are consistent across the whole range of topological degrees and number of
posts and messages sent and received, i.e., we have not identified a subset of users that exhibits
a different behaviour. We therefore assume that this kind of users would have had a limited
impact in our results.
6 Conclusion and future work
Users of online social networks are often provided with privacy settings that allow them to
control what is publicly visible and what is private on the site. Dependence between different
types of OSN data may however enable an adversary to perform inferences about the private
data based on other OSN available data.
Previous work has focused on inferences about private or non disclosed attributes of OSN
users. In this paper we have performed a first analysis on the feasibility of inferring private
communication patterns, i.e., with whom and how often a user communicates. We have focused
on traffic data because while users may use their privacy settings or use encryption to hide their
messages and sensitive attributes, traffic data cannot be easily hidden away from the service
provider or other external adversaries.
We have used both the friendship graph and public communication traffic data from Netlog,
a Belgian OSN, to evalute to what extent these publicly available data leak information about
the amount of private messages users exchange. We have found that, in Netlog, such leakage
of information is minimal as the number of messages users exchange is not related to the OSN
features we have examined. Still, our results cannot be generalised to all OSNs and further work
is needed to confirm whether or not this generally applies to user communication in other or all
OSNs.
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Future work could therefore go in three different directions. First, try to replicate our analysis
in other social networks. Are the results we have obtained observable in other platforms or are
our results particular of Netlog? Second, analyse the relationship between other features and
data. In this work we have focused on social graph topology and public communication traffic
data. Our inference analysis was motivated by a specific setting, namely, one where users
encrypt their communications and attributes such that the content of these are not available
to an adversary. However, this may not always be the case. Whenever content is available, it
may be exploitable by an adversary. The content of messages or personal attributes such as
age, marital status or gender may allow better inferences about users’ private communication.
Also, other social network data may be available depending on the OSN site itself, such as
Likes, comments, photo tags, shares and so on. These may also provide information about
users’ private communication. Third, future work should also examine alternative or more
complex analysis methodologies. We have relied on a Bayesian framework to determine to
what extent a given feature may leak information about another. Other methods should be
explored. Modeling the inference problem as a binary classification problem where the goal
is to predict whether there is any private communication between each pair of users may be
a promising avenue. Existing classification algorithms such as random forests, support vector
machines, or ensembles of classifiers could be applied to train the classifier. Besides, in terms
of features, the ones used in this paper represent just a starting point. Other more complex
features (e.g., eccentricity, centrality or clustering coefficient, among many others) may enable
better inferences.
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